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ABSTRACT
Tackling climate change has provided a key focus for the creation of what
the editors of this special issue have termed ‘environmental intangibles.’
This paper focuses on the European Union Emissions Trading System
(EUETS), a climate policy that revolves around the issuance and trading
of environmental intangibles called emissions allowances. Set up in the
mid-2000s, the cap and trade system has experienced many
complications. We propose here to explore a particularly contentious
issue: the allocation of free allowances. We will see that deciding on
allocation rules leads to vivid debates about whether energy-intensive
industries in Europe, such as the manufacturing of cement, can remain
competitive in the global economy if climate policy is unilaterally
enforced. These debates are focused on a phenomenon referred to as
the risk of carbon leakage due to loss of competitiveness. Drawing on
an empirical enquiry into the workings of policy-making, the paper
examines the ways, in which this risk is framed and questioned through
lobbying and evidential work. We suggest that the threat to
competitiveness posed by the EUETS can neither be established, nor
dismissed; a form of under-determination is maintained and carbon
leakage as a never-quite-tangible possibility becomes a battleground
for protecting European industry over the environment.
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Tackling climate change has provided a key focus for the marketisation of environmental interven-
tions, creating what the editors of this special issue have termed ‘environmental intangibles’ such as
carbon footprints (Walenta 2021, unpublished manuscript) or conservation credits (Barral 2021,
unpublished manuscript). The term points toward an issue recurrently discussed with regards to
these new environmental markets: the numerical abstraction that underlies marketisation and by
which ‘intangibles,’ such as carbon offsets and emissions allowances, are produced as dis-connected
from the industrial activities to be regulated or the natural landscapes to be protected (Lohmann
2009, Roberston 2012, Dempsey 2016). Through this process of abstraction, exhaust gases released,
for example, from burning limestone and clay to manufacture cement in a given location are
expressed in tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) and made commensurable to the emissions of other
cement plants and industrial facilities (oil refineries, coal- powered facilities, blast furnaces, chemi-
cal plants etc.) located in distant places. Commensuration is needed to establish a market where
permits to emit CO2 can be traded among these sites (MacKenzie 2009a) and appear on balance
sheets (Chiapello and Engels 2021, unpublished manuscript). Commensuration also brings into
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being new numerical aggregates (e.g. an industry’s emissions level). Although it may appear less
tangible than the noisy, dusty industrial plants from which it derives, and of which it provides
an abstract representation, this numerical reality is the stuff of (market-based) policy; it can be
put into relation with other aggregates (e.g. an industry’s trade flows and gross added value) and
used to make consequential decisions.
Our paper examines the ways, in which numerical abstraction becomes a policy battleground in
the EuropeanUnion Emissions Trading System (EUETS). Drawing onwork in Science and Technol-
ogy Studies on European regulation (Barry 2001, Laurent 2019) and carbon markets (MacKenzie
2009a, 2009b), we pay attention to the tools – formula, indicators, statistics etc. – used to discuss
and decide on a particularly contentious aspect of the EUETS: how to regulate the CO2 emissions
of energy-intensive industries. Debates revolve around the notion of ‘carbon leakage due to loss of
competitiveness.’ The term refers to the risk that, in a globalised world, climate policy in Europe
might lead to domestic producers losing market share to foreign competitors and imports from
regions where emissions are not regulated. We will see that, while in the EUETS this risk justifies
an alleviation of the environmental constraint for energy-intensive sectors, such as the manufactur-
ing of cement, its credibility is also actively questioned. Indeed, carbon leakage due to loss of competi-
tiveness has not beenobserved, yet. Evidence suggests itmight actually not be a real threat. But it is not
possible either to assert with great certainty that it will never materialise. Therefore, we suggest that
carbon leakage provides an opportunity to think about economic under-determination in climate
policy and how this plays out in an intervention that seeks to achieve an environmental benefit
(seeChiapello and Engels 2021 this issue) at the same time asmaintaining industrial competitiveness.
Emissions trading, or cap and trade policy originated within economics. It operates by setting a
limit on CO2 emissions within a jurisdiction and through the issuance of a finite quantity of emis-
sions allowances that can be traded among regulated entities (an allowance usually represents one
tonne of CO2). Economists and policy-makers consider that trading allows the cap to be met at the
lowest aggregated cost: a company able to reduce its emissions at a low cost will do so, and keep or
sell allowances it might have in excess, while a company facing high abatement costs will instead
buy the cheaper allowances. In a cap and trade system, market agents choose whether or not,
and how, they develop emissions reduction strategies or invest in cleaner technologies. The market
is expected to stimulate a decentralised process of exploration and distribute the mitigation effort so
that emissions decrease where it costs the least. Praised for its cost-efficiency, cap and trade is now a
well-established climate policy (Lederer 2017). The EUETS was the first large-scale attempt to run
such an economic experiment (Wettestad 2005), extending over 31 countries and regulating more
than 11,000 ‘installations’ (a regulated installation is defined by its ownership of a fuel combustion
unit of a certain size).1
If the economics-inflected account sketched above appears straightforward, Europe’s practical
experience with cap and trade turned out to be more complicated. On-going problems have plagued
the policy despite it being open to revision.2 The EUETS was devised to operate in phases. In the
first two phases (2005–2007 and 2008–2012), cap setting and the allocation of allowances were
national prerogatives. Companies and their installations received allowances for free, based on
their past emissions and within the limits of rather generous national caps (on the French case,
see Godard 2005). Free allocation of relatively large quantities of allowances seemed to have
been a political move to respond to early concerns about possible adverse effects on the competi-
tiveness of European industry. The risk that some over-allocation may occur (too many allowances
compared to emissions levels) was taken to ensure acceptance among affected businesses.3 But the
economic recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis dramatically increased the imbalance. A
surplus of unneeded allowances began to accumulate in the market and the price paid for emitting
CO2 durably dropped (Chaffin 2012).
4 This surplus marked the second phase of the EUETS and
continued growing after 2012. In preparation for phase 3 (2013–2020), the institutions of the Euro-
pean Union decided to further harmonise, and strengthen, the policy. The EUETS was restructured
around a single EU-wide emissions cap decreasing annually and common allocation rules. But these
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changes did not address the problem of the surplus. The value of the cap was derived from an emis-
sions reduction target that member states had agreed upon in 2007, before the economic recession
occurred. Modelling had helped compute the cost-effective split of this broader reduction effort
between sectors regulated by the EUETS (thus fixing the value of the cap), and other activities emit-
ting greenhouse gases (agriculture, transport, etc.). The total quantity of allowances to be issued
(that is the cap) was then divided up into auctioned allowances and free allowances that were
only distributed to ‘industrial installations’ (all those that were not electricity producers – more
on the reasons for this later). The European Commission was put in charge of supervising free allo-
cation through complex calculations, taking into account the risk of ‘carbon leakage due to loss of
competitiveness.’ Such a risk justified the distribution of free (surplus) allowances to many indus-
trial sectors. For sections related to the construction industry, such as the manufacturing of steel
and cement, this comprised a significant number of allowances given the enduring decline of pro-
duction and CO2 emissions in the aftermath of the recession. While free allocation was thus main-
tained in phase 3, the credibility of the threat it ought to mitigate (carbon leakage) started being
contested. As we shall see, the situation has since been one of on-going under-determination.
Our focus here is on the elusive, yet enduring risk of carbon leakage, how it is assessed, contested,
reframed, and with what consequences. We build on fieldwork carried out in Brussels, Paris and
London in 2016 and 2017, where we conducted extensive documentary research, especially on
the EUETS legislative process, and in-depth interviews with a range of stakeholders – from staff
members of the European Commission, to national civil servants and parliamentary assistants,
from academic economists, to environmental activists and industrial lobbyists. Our empirical
account will be structured in three parts, each foregrounding a particular facet of the problem
of/with carbon leakage. A first section will examine the criteria and data that were used in phase
3 to operationalise the distribution of free allowances to vulnerable sectors. We will then engage
with the evidential work that was carried out ahead of revising the EUETS rules for phase 4 to assess
the credibility of the threat of carbon leakage and decide on the future of free allowances. Thirdly,
we will turn to a specific sector deemed vulnerable to carbon leakage, the manufacturing of cement,
which has been singled out for having greatly benefitted from the surplus of free allowances. But
before all this, we propose to further unpack the concept of competitiveness and discuss what an
analysis of its under-determination can bring to the study of economic uncertainty in environ-
mental policy.
Acting within conditions of under-determination
For economists, the notion of carbon leakage captures the idea that, in a globalised world where
capital and goods freely flow across borders, CO2 emissions can increase outside a jurisdiction as
a result of climate action enforced in that jurisdiction (Hourcade et al. 2007, Dröge et al. 2009).
This increase is expressed as a leakage rate counterbalancing the positive impact of the policy
(here the emissions cap). Economists suggest that the relocation of emissions unfolds through
two different dynamics. The first depends on the global fossil fuels market. If demand for polluting
energy declines in the regulated space because cleaner sources are sought, the global price of fossil
fuels will decrease, which might increase their consumption, and CO2 emissions levels, in unregu-
lated jurisdictions. The second means through which carbon leakage might occur is ‘the competi-
tiveness channel.’ If domestic industries increase the price of their products in response to the
additional cost imposed by the policy (the cost of buying allowances), they risk losing market
share to cheaper, imported products. Activity and emissions will increase outside the regulated
space, and in the long run, an entire industry may relocate to unregulated jurisdictions. In both
cases, carbon leakage is an accidental consequence of unilateral climate action in an interconnected
world where products, such as oil, steel, cement and aluminium, are (or can be) traded globally and
production moves easily. To prevent loss of competitiveness, the environmental constraint can be
alleviated for vulnerable sectors, which in a cap and trade system means, for example, giving some
JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY 3
allowances for free to reduce the cost of compliance. The European Union being the first large jur-
isdiction to have a climate policy, this hypothetical dynamic was a preoccupation from the start. But
the term carbon leakage really pervaded policy discussions when the EUETS entered its third, more
centralised phase in 2013 when more persistent questions were raised regarding the free allocation
of allowances that had been maintained until that point. Carbon leakage due to loss of competitive-
ness has, quite understandably, become a key theme when industrial associations argue for the con-
tinuation of free allowances.
Carbon leakage is a spatial and numerical problem. In her work on the energy sector in Baltic
countries, Kama (2014) clearly shows its territorial aspect. She describes how the Estonian govern-
ment managed to introduce in the EUETS a special measure for member states where national
power grids were connected to networks outside the European Union (in Russia notably, a legacy
from the Soviet Union). It was argued that carbon leakage could occur via cheaper imports of elec-
tricity produced by plants not subjected to any climate policy. In addition to the environmental
harm, dependence on imports would weaken Europe’s energy security. Hence it was decided
that energy providers in these countries could benefit from free allocation (this measure derogates
from the rule applying to the rest of the power sector –more on this later). Here we develop a simi-
lar spatial sensibility to explore the ways, in which the positioning of the European Union within the
global economy is brought about in debates and decisions about the EUETS and carbon leakage (cf.
Barry 2001). As we will see, statistics and other numerical abstractions are central to such an effect
(Mitchell, 2002, Didier 2009). Delineating a statistical territory, creating classes and categories (sec-
tors, sub-sectors, products), developing indicators and calculating ratios, all these practices aim to
grasp the economic impact of the climate policy through relations between aggregates (emissions
levels, imports, exports, gross added value etc.).
And yet, despite all these numbers, or maybe because of all these numbers, we argue that carbon
leakage due to loss of competitiveness is characterised by a form of under-determination: the exist-
ence of such a risk keeps being called into question, but the possibility of the phenomenon cannot
be entirely dismissed either. Two reasons can be put forward for why this may be so. Kama (2014)
identifies a first reason in the forward-looking nature of carbon leakage. She suggests that it is ‘a
future threat of an event “that has not happened and may never happen”’ and describes free allow-
ances as ‘a form of pre-emption’ (p. 208). Carbon leakage is an uncertain risk. A second reason that
might help us understand its on-going under-determination lies in the very idea of competitiveness.
Competitiveness became a panacea in European governance in the 1990s. The notion works in a
world where goods and capital are assumed to freely circulate, and these global movements appear
unstoppable (and desirable). As stressed by Davies (2016), concerns about competitiveness fuse the
economic and the political in a peculiar way. Nation-states (here the European Union) engage in a
never-ending economic battle with the rest of the world and political communities become
indebted to the business activities taking place within their borders. As it appears impossible to con-
sider that an economy is competitive enough, the result is a ‘sense of anxiety amongst political lea-
ders’ (Davies 2016, p 138). When she discusses benchmarking as a means to steer national policies
and make a ‘competitive Europe,’ Bruno (2009) develops a similar point. Using a Foucauldian reg-
ister, she talks about ‘the “indefinite discipline” of competitiveness’ (p. 277). It follows that the risk
of being less competitiveness is nearly impossible to debunk. A policy like the EUETS that might
undermine European industry by increasing the cost of its products logically exacerbates this com-
petition-based anxiety.
What we call economic under-determination – a situation, in which processes that are economic
in nature (carbon leakage and its non-existence) appear to be accounted for with less than the
amount of evidence needed to satisfy key audiences that they can be firmly established – invites
us to think about uncertainty in policy-making in new ways. The sociology of ignorance has
shown that uncertainty can be strategically produced by powerful actors (companies and regulators
alike) to deflect attention, evade responsibility or prevent regulation (McGoey 2007, 2012). Organ-
ised climate denial in the United States is a good example (Oreskes 2010). Given the vitality of
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business lobbying in Brussels (Laurens 2018), one might consider that carbon leakage is just another
case of strategic maintenance of doubt and unknowns. But this would miss out the intractability of
the phenomenon at stake. By arguing that economic under-determination here is unresolvable, we
then also depart from another body of work, which sees uncertainty, and controversy, as fostering a
new form of democracy (Callon et al. 2009). Initially developed with regards to decision making
about technoscientific innovations, this argument was extended to carbon markets, at a time
when these regulatory interventions were emerging and could be envisioned as sites for collective
experimentation (Callon 2009, MacKenzie 2009b). A decade later, our inquiry into the EUETS
nuances the optimistic vision that anticipated a learning by doing dynamic open to questioning.
The slippery notion of competitiveness, for example, while it is so crucial in drawing the limits
of the EUETS, has been left largely unquestioned. As we shall see now, carbon leakage due to
loss of competitiveness too often amounts to an appeal to authority, foreclosing in-depth discussion
of the future of European industry under an ambitious climate policy.
Defining exposure to the risk of carbon leakage
As mentioned, when the EUETS entered its third phase (2013–2020), it was further harmonised and
common allocation rules were introduced. The Directive revised in 2009 aimed to better regulate
the supply of free allowances and engage a transition from generous national allocations to a future
regime (possibly in phase 4), in which all allowances might be auctioned. In the meantime, free allo-
cation aimed ‘to address the risk of carbon leakage,’ according to a rigorous assessment (OJUE
2009). The amount of allowances given out for free was set at 43% of the cap so as to match the
proportion of emissions from industrial installations (defined as not being electricity suppliers)
in previous phases. It was decided that each eligible installation would, every year, receive a quantity
based on the following formula: historic activity levels (specific to the installation), multiplied by a
product benchmark (specific to the industrial product), multiplied by a carbon leakage factor
(specific to the industrial sector), multiplied by a factor reflecting the annual decrease of the cap5
(applied to all installations). For this formula to be implemented, the category of being at risk of
carbon leakage needed to be delineated. How that was done is our focus here.
In order to operationalise free allocation and give a numerical value to the carbon leakage factor,
the industrial activities regulated by the EUETS had, first of all, to be sorted out into sectors. The
statistical apparatus and data infrastructure of the European Union proved essential here as it allows
anyone in an office in Brussels to ‘grasp the economic activity’ and frame it for the workings of the
policy, explained a staffmember of the Commission involved in the process (interview DG CLIMA
1). A certain level of disaggregation was chosen in the Statistical Classification of Economic Activi-
ties in the European Union (NACE). It was known as NACE 4 and helped demarcate 250 sectors,
ranging from the ‘manufacture of wallpaper’ and ‘of basic pharmaceutical products,’ to the ‘man-
ufacture of fertilisers and nitrogen compounds’ and ‘of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys.’ The
Commission used this classification to draw ‘a list of sectors and subsectors, which are deemed to be
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage’ that it would regularly update.
To assess exposure to such a risk, two criteria were applied: ‘cost intensity’ and ‘trade intensity.’
These calculative tools worked as proxies to evaluate whether, or not, an industrial sector would be
able to support the cost of buying allowances. The indicators captured if an activity could comply
with the EUETS, without losing market share to cheaper products manufactured by foreign com-
petitors and causing carbon leakage due to loss of competitiveness. As suggested by an economist
(below), whose work fed into the conception of the two criteria used by the Commission, the ability
to increase product prices is the best proof that an industry is not threatened by foreign
competition.
In terms of the carbon intensity [equivalent to cost intensity] of the sector, and measuring, ‘which are the
industries that will really feel the carbon costs in their operating costs?’ this indicator is quite straightforward.
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But in terms of, ‘how vulnerable, how exposed to international competition are these sectors?,’ trade [inten-
sity] is just one of many indicators that can be used. In fact, it’s not a great one because trade fluctuates over
time; it’s just the most obvious. Ideally, if you could directly estimate the cost pass-through ability in these
sectors, then that’s what we’re really interested in. If the sectors really can’t pass through any of the carbon
cost, then they’re clearly exposed to competition. But if they’re able to pass on 100%, or 120%, then they
don’t really need the free allocation. This is quite hard to do for sectors that are not… electricity basically.
The electricity market, you know, they have high-frequency data, we know they adopt marginal-cost pricing,
so it’s a no-brainer. But when it comes to steel and cement, it’s really hard to get product prices at a high fre-
quency. (interview, economist 1)
The economist drew a contrast between the electricity sector and industries like cement and steel,
regarding the simplicity, with which what she termed ‘cost pass-through ability’ could be
assessed. Some of her colleagues had produced evidence that, in the early days of the EUETS,
electricity prices were fluctuating with the price, at which allowances were being traded. The
demonstration built on econometric tests using high-frequency data obtained from trading plat-
forms where electricity contracts are exchanged (cf. Sijm et al. 2006). Although power companies
had not paid for most of the allowances used for compliance (generous allocation from member
states), they seemed to have factored in a carbon cost into their pricing strategies and were, there-
fore, passing on that cost. Their cost pass through ability relied on the physicality of electricity
networks, preventing imports (except in Baltic countries, Kama 2014) and limiting consumer
choices. Once made public, the behaviour of power companies triggered an outcry: they could
be making ‘windfall profits’ environmental organisations argued.6 It followed that under the har-
monised allocation rules in phase 3, electricity suppliers could not get anything for free. Free
allowances were maintained only for manufacturing industry, broadly conceived, and supposedly
targeted towards the sectors deemed less able to pass on costs (OJEU 2009). Many industries
seemed potentially concerned. With little publicly available information on their pricing strat-
egies, an indirect approach was developed to evaluate their vulnerability based on the two indi-
cators introduced above.
Drawing the contour of the sectors at risk of carbon leakage prompted a series of numerical
abstractions. A sector was judged exposed, if its cost intensity was above 30%, or if its trade intensity
was above 30%, or if its cost intensity was above 5% and its trade intensity above 10%. Cost intensity
was defined as the ratio between the costs of the EUETS for the sector and the latter’s gross value
added. For economists, the criterion might be ‘straightforward,’ because it represents the dynamic
leading to loss of competitiveness. Climate policy would increase production costs via the need to
purchase allowances and higher electricity prices, assuming the power sector passed on its own cost
of compliance. For a given sector, the effect of such a cost increase – how much it would be ‘felt’ –
was considered to be relative to the sector’s capacity to produce value in the economy, as captured
by its gross value added.7 But moving from theoretical considerations to actual numbers proved
tricky. If gross value added is an indicator routinely computed by the statistical agency of the Euro-
pean Union (Eurostat), calculating the hypothetical costs involved more work for the Commission.
Additional information needed to be collected (e.g. the emissions level of a sector had to be aggre-
gated based on installation data retrieved from the EUETS database) and choices to be made to
apply the counterfactual reasoning (e.g. what would be the cost pass through strategy of the
power sector).
In contrast, trade intensity was easier to compute. It relied on one of Eurostat’s databases that
records the movements of manufactured products in and out of the ‘statistical territory’ of the Euro-
pean Union (European Commission 2009, p. 31). For a given sector, trade intensity was then
defined as the ratio of the total value of imports and exports with non-European countries, against
the total market size of the European Union (turnover and imports). But the problem here was that
the indicator and its thresholds lacked focus. Along with industrial goods, like steel and aluminium,
it also classified as being at risk of carbon leakage some surprising businesses, the competitiveness of
which would clearly not be affected by having to pay for a few allowances: ‘ice cream makers,
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imitation jewellery, clock making are on the list, because they’re trade intensive,’ summarised a civil
servant of the European Commission (interview, DG CLIMA 2).
Assessing exposure to the risk of carbon leakage and establishing a list of sectors in need of pro-
tection was a ‘heavy process,’ recalled another staff member of the Commission (interview, DG
CLIMA 1). It involved a lot of ‘data crunching’ and many adjustments (European Commission
2009). Industrial associations and manufacturers could make the case for being evaluated according
to a product-specific classification if NACE 4 was thought inappropriate. Such ad hoc inclusion
allowed, for example, the subsector of French fries – ‘Frozen potatoes, prepared or preserved
(including potatoes cooked or partly cooked in oil and then frozen; excluding by vinegar or acetic
acid) – to be considered at risk, when the NACE 4 sector ‘Processing and preserving of potatoes’was
not (OJEU 2013). Furthermore, inclusion could also be argued via a ‘qualitative assessment,’ if the
two indicators of the ‘quantitative assessment’ were missing out on certain features of an activity
(European Commission 2009). As a result, in phase 3, almost every installation that was not a
power station belonged to a (sub)sector deemed exposed to carbon leakage. This directly impacted
the quantity of free allowances these installations were to receive. In the allocation formula, for
activities deemed at risk, the carbon leakage factor was set at 1 throughout the phase, while for
others, it was set at 0.8% in 2013 and decreased annually to reach 0.3% in 2020.
To address the possible threat of carbon leakage, evidence had to be collated and choices made.
The formula for deciding how and to whom allowances could be given out for free, drew on indi-
cators that conceive of carbon leakage as a risk, to which manufacturers residing within the econ-
omic, legal and statistical space of the European Union might be exposed. This definition of
carbon leakage is an operational one. It aims to ensure that exposed sectors receive a higher
share of free allowances than those not considered to be vulnerable. Business statistics, criteria,
thresholds and a series of numerical abstractions helped the European Commission identify,
which industrial activity was likely to suffer economically, if it had to bear the full cost associated
with the EUETS. This indirect assessment of what economists call the ‘cost pass through ability’
of an industry seemed, however, to lack precision and, as we shall see now, has been called into
question.
A contested but enduring threat with consequences
The criteria-based definition described above is not the only way the elusive process of carbon leak-
age due to loss of competitiveness has shaped the EUETS. The idea of carbon leakage first emerged
within environmental economics. To continue exploring the question of economic under-determi-
nation, this section will examine some of the ways, in which economists have construed the
phenomenon. We then turn to recent policy discussions about whether free allocation in the
EUETS should be maintained after 2020. These discussions occurred in light of retrospective econ-
omic analyses suggesting the risk, as defined in phase 3, might have been overestimated.
As the EUETS entered phase 2 in 2008, a group of economists from British, French and German
universities and research centers published a series of studies about carbon leakage due to loss of
competitiveness. These studies used models, whereby various leakage rates could be calculated
for key sectors (cement, steel, aluminium, etc.) under different scenarios (different allocation
rules, such as free allowances or auction) (see Dröge et al. 2009). According to an economist
involved in this work, the message was that leakage was possible, although the actual rates were
not meant to be predictions (interview, economist 2). Modelling aimed to inform policy discussions
on the allocation of allowances in the forthcoming third phase. But where it enabled economists to
get a sense of the dynamics at stake, industrial associations saw in the possibility to calculate
impressive leakage rates a lobbying technique. In a report that the European cement association
commissioned from a consulting firm in 2008, one can read that, with a forecasted allowance
price of 25 euros, more than 80% of European cement production ‘will be at risk of offshoring’
(BCG 2008). The statement is accompanied by a map of the European Union where a colour
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range represents the vulnerability to carbon leakage – the more vulnerable, the redder, with large
areas in orange-red acting as a warning.
Five years later, as the EUETS moved into its third phase (2013–2020), the European Commis-
sion asked consultants to investigate ‘whether there is factual evidence for the occurrence of carbon
leakage over phases 1 and 2 of the EUETS (2005–2012)’ (Bolscher et al. 2013).8 Such retrospective
analyses would help prepare for the revision of the policy beyond 2020 (phase 4). The report even-
tually concluded there was ‘no evidence for any carbon leakage’ (p. 11). The assessment had focused
on specific sectors (e.g. steel, glass, pulp and paper, refined petroleum products), about which pro-
duction and trade data were gathered, available literature reviewed, and industry consultations
organised. Each sector (products, costs, prices, demand, trade flows, investments etc.) was docu-
mented in an attempt to identify the ‘drivers’ of a possible relocation of production. If we take
the steel industry, which produces a range of materials (flat steel for cars and washing machines;
long steel for rails and reinforced concrete) using manufacturing processes emitting large quantities
of CO2 emissions, the report stated that: ‘changes in trade flows [of steel products] of the EU can
mainly be attributed to changes in domestic demand (especially between 2006 and 2009) and in the
development of China being able to satisfy both the rapidly increasing Asian demand and become a
next exporter’ (p. 23). The study pointed towards ‘a shift of world demand’ (p. 35) as the main
explanation of changing trade flows. Given that blast furnaces and steel works had received
(many) allowances for free, the authors could not exclude that free allocation might have prevented
carbon leakage from occurring. But their analysis clearly cast doubt on the credibility of the climate
policy being a major threat to European industry especially compared to recent macroeconomic
shifts.
In order to further assess whether carbon leakage had occurred, and whether it was likely to
occur in the future, more sophisticated approaches were also proposed in the academic literature,
from which consultancies appointed by the Commission would later draw on. The implementation
of the EUETS has been producing data (emission levels and allowances prices) that could be used to
switch from modelling to econometrics. For example, economists showed that in the case of steel
and cement, higher demand in Europe (respectively in the rest of the world) was associated with
increasing (respectively decreasing) net imports, while the allowance price had ‘no explanatory
power on net imports’ (Branger et al. 2013, p. 20). Econometric techniques apprehend carbon leak-
age as a statistical link, the robustness of which is testable. In the presence of leakage, high allowance
price would imply higher production costs, a loss of market share vis-à-vis foreign producers, and
an increase in net imports. As this numerical relationship could not be detected, the economists
conducting these analyses suggested that carbon leakage had not been observed in the past. Changes
in trade flows appeared (statistically) independent from the cost of CO2, calling for nuancing the
‘fear of competitiveness and carbon leakage’ disseminated by industrial lobbies (Branger et al.
2013, p. 23).
In Brussels, the accumulation of reports and studies contributed to consolidate the idea that the
risk of carbon leakage due to loss of competitiveness might have been overstated, making free allo-
cation harder to justify. Perhaps policy debates could move from under-determination to evidential
satisfaction that this was not a serious enough risk to exempt most industrial manufacturers from
buying their allowances. Besides, arguments were made by environmental organisations that free
allocation deprived member states from auction revenues and undermined the development of
abatement technologies and strategies. A sign that even industrial lobbyists tended to agree that car-
bon leakage had not been observed (yet) was a discursive move to talk about ‘investment leakage’
instead. Investment leakage is ‘when companies decide to invest less and less in a new capacity or
invest less in maintaining and upgrading existing capacity,’ explained a lobbyist (interview, Business
Europe). This new risk was made visible through an opinion survey where industrial executives had
been asked how they thought the price of allowances would develop in the future and what its
impact would be on their investments in Europe.9 Most respondents expected the price to increase
and have negative consequences. The survey was released at an event gathering industrial
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representatives, officials of the European Commission and members of the European Parliament, at
a time when discussions about phase 4 of the EUETS were on-going. Because investment decisions
depend on perceptions of future constraints and opportunities, talking of investment leakage would
make it harder to produce counter-evidence.
The allocation rules that would apply in phase 4, from 2021 to 2030, were under negotiation
from 2015 to 2017. Based on its ‘impact assessment,’ the European Commission published in the
summer of 2015 a Proposal for revising the Directive (European Commission 2015). Despite con-
sensus around the absence of proof that carbon leakage occurred in the past, it did not suggest the
termination of free allocation. The Proposal built on the conclusions of the European Council in
March 2014, when the heads of states and governments had explicitly insisted on having measures
to prevent potential carbon leakage (European Council 2014). The Proposal, therefore, introduced
only a few changes in the allocation rules. To exclude from the carbon leakage list sectors that were
only trade intensive (e.g. clock makers), it suggested a combined criterion that would be compared
to different thresholds in a ‘tiered approach.’ Instead of a binary categorisation (at risk or not), four
degrees of exposure (high risk, middle risk, low risk and no risk) were identified, leading to differ-
entiated treatments to ensure that free allowances benefitted only the most vulnerable industries.
Carbon leakage was one of the most contentious topics debated as part of the revision of the
EUETS Directive. Various industrial associations contested the tiered approach during consul-
tations held at the Commission. Lobbying against a tighter allocation regime also targeted members
of the European Parliament.10 The Commission had handed out the Proposal to a subgroup of par-
liamentarians, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), tasked with
drafting a text that would be submitted to the whole assembly to vote on.11 The draft of the ENVI
Committee kept the tiered approach, but in the plenary session, further amendments were intro-
duced and a majority eventually voted to return to the binary categorisation (at risk or not).
Environmental organisations attributed this twist to the German steel industry.
We heard from a German NGO that a very influential MEP [Members of the European Parliament] from
Saarland had a lot of pressure from the steel lobby that sent out a letter five days before the vote. We tried
to write a response and meet with the MEP and its assistants, we were also in touch with the socialist shadow
rapporteur, but the pressure from the steel industry spread out, and they created an alliance with trade unions
in Saarland. (interview, environmental organisation)
The environmental activist quoted above further reported that trade unions organised demon-
strations in protest against an overly stringent EUETS, which would spell the end of the steel indus-
try and increase unemployment.12 And so, the vote in Strasbourg in February 2017 was shaped at a
distance by the politics of steel in Germany.13
After being agreed by ministerial representatives, the rules of the EUETS for phase 4 eventually
entered into force in April 2018 to be applied from January 2021. A single combined criterion sub-
stitutes the two indicators used so far (carbon and trade intensity) and only one threshold helps
identify exposed sectors. The Directive still includes many routes for an industry failing the quan-
titative test to make the case for its inclusion (OJEU 2018). All this might cast doubt on the earn-
estness of the claim that ‘auctioning of allowances remains the general rule, with free allocation as
the exception’ (ibid.). Rather what we see is a policy endorsing a form of ‘regulatory precaution’
where exception and exemption tend to be the norm (Laurent 2019).
Free allocation, whether it should be maintained, and for which sectors, seem an irreconcilable
issue given the under-determined nature of carbon leakage due to loss of competitiveness. Carbon
leakage first gained consistency as an economic calculation, based on hypothetical costs and
assumptions about a friction-less global economy. Its realisation, however, was not statistically
detected in the records of the European economy. But it might actually not be observable for
quite some time, if, as business lobbyists more recently argued, the risk is better understood as gra-
dual disinterest and disinvestment in European industry. Numerical abstractions have proliferated
to assess the credibility of the threat, without resolving its under-determination. Compared to
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opinion surveys, lobbying and union politics, numbers appeared quite weak in shaping the latest
revision of the policy.
Coming closer to industrial realities
In this last section, we move away from the legislative process to engage with an industry deemed
vulnerable to loss of competitiveness. The focus will be on the ‘manufacture of cement.’ Based on
the indicators and thresholds examined earlier, the 200 or so cement plants responsible for c 6% of
total CO2 emissions that the EUETS regulates, were at risk (Neuhoff et al. 2014).
14 Cement compa-
nies have thus received large quantities of free allowances throughout phase 3. In a similar fashion
to the steel industry, their business association lobbied against the tightening of free allocation in
phase 4. By asking how the policy applies to a specific sector, we can come closer to industrial rea-
lities and look at the on-going under-determination of carbon leakage from that angle.
The cement industry was identified as being exposed to carbon leakage due to loss of competi-
tiveness solely based on its cost intensity. Early on, economists and their models had singled out
cement production for that reason (Hourcade et al. 2007). The cost intensity ratio calculated by
the European Commission indicated that the value at stake for the industry was well above the
30% threshold. Cement is a low added value material, the manufacturing of which generates
large emissions. The key step in this process consists in heating ground limestone and clay,
which releases large quantities of CO2, both from fuel combustion and the chemical transformation
itself. Sedimentary rocks are decarbonised to obtain a material called clinker able to harden with
water. Mixed with sand and stones to produce concrete, cement is widely consumed due to its
low cost and high versatility. With the material’s physical properties and commercial qualities
depending on emitting CO2, it was anticipated that decreasing the sector’s emissions would not
be an easy task.
In contrast to cost intensity, trade intensity in the cement sector was actually quite low a decade
ago, when all these calculations were performed. The reason is that, although European cement
companies are often multinational, cement markets tend to be local, spread across 200 km around
a plant and its quarry. This is due to high transportation costs, especially by road, relative to the low
added value of the material. Along the seacoast, the situation slightly differs. Shipping bulk cement
over long distances is technically feasible at reasonable costs (Dumez and Jeunemaître 1998). When
carbon leakage was still a matter of ex ante analysis, some economists developed spatial models to
calculate differentiated leakage rates showing that coastal regions, where the industry comes into
contact with the global economy, might be more vulnerable than the hinterlands (Ponssard and
Walker 2008).
Deemed at risk of loss of competitiveness, in the EUETS cement companies have accumulated a
surplus of allowances, well beyond their needs, from the start of phase 2 and throughout phase
3. While in the mid-2000s, production of cement was high to satisfy high demand in the construc-
tion and housing sectors, these activities collapsed with the financial crisis, especially in Southern
European countries. The period between 2008 and 2012 was marked by cement plants reporting
emissions levels much lower than the quantities of allowances they were entitled to in the allocation
plans of most member states (Branger and Quirion 2015). Large over-allocation to the sector
further continued into phase 3. To understand why, two parameters of the allocation formula
must be considered: ‘historic activity levels’ and ‘product benchmark.’ As the European Commis-
sion was working on the new allocation rules (assessing the carbon leakage risk), it also established
‘benchmarks’ for more than 50 ‘product categories’ (e.g. ‘tissue,’ ‘nitric acid,’ ‘cement clinker’).15
Benchmarks are expressed in tonnes of CO2 emitted per tonne of product and calculated as the
average emission efficiency of the 10 best installations. Industrial associations and manufacturers
were involved in the calculation, because it required access to confidential production data and
an agreement on the definition of the product category. In the cement sector, the benchmarking
exercise amounted to a struggle for the distribution of free allowances among market competitors
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(like the setting of market standards, Laurens 2018). Indeed, multiplied by ‘historic activity levels,’
‘product benchmark’ would reward the plants that had been chosen to set the value of the bench-
mark with a volume of allowances close to their future needs. More polluting installations would in
contrast be short of allowances. This ought to provide an incentive to improve environmental per-
formance across the sector. But the subtle incentivising effect was quickly swamped. Far too many
allowances continued to be distributed in phase 3, as the Commission used the period between 2005
and 2008 to calculate the ‘historic activity levels’ used in the allocation formula for phase 3. Pre-cri-
sis years constituted the baseline to allocate free allowances in times of recession.
The problematic accumulation of a surplus of allowances in the EUETS goes beyond the cement
industry and free allocation.16 Where free allocation comes in, is with regards to distributional
issues. As an excess of allowances started developing in the system, an environmental organisation
established a ‘carbon rich list’ by assigning the surplus to specific companies (Sandbag 2010).
Cement manufacturers were high on that list. A few years later, the same organisation decided
to further look into the cement industry, shaming five companies for having ‘collectively received
nearly €1 billion worth of spare EU allowances’ (Sandbag 2016). These environmentalists sought to
participate in the policy debate about the revision of the EUETS, advocating, with others, for a
reform of free allocation (in favour of the tiered approach). Besides the surplus question, their
enquiry into the cement industry also revealed a serious regulatory flaw. According to the allocation
rules in place in phase 3, if an installation is operating below 50% of its production capacity, this
must be reported to the relevant national authority, and a reduction of 50% applies to the amount
of allowances distributed the following year. But, as long as industrial activity is above that
threshold, full supply of allowances is secured. As a result, where the construction sector suffered
most from the crisis, cement plants seemed to have kept production levels just above 50% of their
capacity to secure full free allocation. A group of economists detected the ‘gaming’ pattern and
environmental organisations relayed the findings (Neuhoff et al. 2014, Branger et al. 2015). The
new Directive eventually modified the rule to mitigate this threshold effect in phase 4.
Evidence was being produced that carbon leakage protection had maintained cement pro-
duction, and associated CO2 emissions, possibly beyond what would have happened if allowances
had not been freely allocated. The environmental organisation that publicised the problem, tried to
trace the movements of this cement surplus through trade statistics. Gaming, it seems, allowed
companies with assets in various European countries to optimise activities across the value chain
(clinker production, grinding, concrete production) by transferring excess production from
countries hit by the crisis, like Spain, to regions where the construction sector was still thriving,
like the London area. In addition to these internal arrangements, trade flows suggested that gaming
might have increased net non-EU exports. Clinker manufactured in European plants, where pro-
duction costs ought to be higher because of the EUETS, had been exported to regions with no cli-
mate policy, to South America for example (interview, Sandbag). This was talked about as carbon
leakage ‘in reverse’ (Sandbag 2016, p. 4), in that the EUETS led to ‘a net import of emissions’ (p. 7).
The investigation also showed that ‘the clinker ratio has risen from 76% in 2008 to 80% in 2013 in
Spain’ for example (Sandbag 2016, p. 27). The ratio refers to the percentage of clinker contained in
cement products. It is an indicator of the product’s environmental performance. The production of
clinker is the manufacturing stage that generates most CO2 emissions. Clinker can be partially com-
pensated for with slag from blast furnaces or fly ash from coal plants. This is one of the easiest ways
to reduce the emissions of commercialised cement. Information about the value of the clinker ratio
per country is made available through a corporate sustainability initiative. According to this data-
base, cement was manufactured with higher ratios in countries where there was excess capacity.
This suggested that the regulatory loophole – the 50% capacity rule –might be seriously undermin-
ing the very purpose of climate policy.
Lack of evidence of carbon leakage and clear evidence of counter-productive effects have not
stopped the European cement industry from arguing against the end of free allocation. As noted
with the shift to investment leakage, conjuring up gloomy futures can be a lobbying tactic. For
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the executive of a cement multinational quoted below, in a future where the EUETS imposes
additional costs on the industry, and in a world where jurisdictions are engaged in an economic
battle (cf. Davies 2016), there is a real threat of cement dumping from abroad.
In China, it’s having over capacity of 600 m tonnes. They are going to close plants, but we don’t know how
much. They have an over capacity and you have seen what happened in the steel industry in Europe, due to
the dumping this year. […] It might be that in 2020, we have to say, ‘Okay, we will close all our plants in
Europe, because there is no protection anymore.’ […] At this moment, I have, from China, cement can be
transported, is transported to Europe. The cost price of transport from China to Rotterdam is €7 per tonne.
Do you know what the sale price of cement is? €60, €70, so it’s 10% [which is not much]. (interview, cement
executive)
The quote suggests that, if companies needed to pay for their allowances, once their surplus is used
up, cement imports would become competitive. Credible or not, the risk of carbon leakage displays
stubborn endurance, including through bad faith. In the same conversation, the cement executive
condemned China subsidising steel exports and acknowledged that his company used the 50%
capacity rule to maximise the amount of free allowances (a kind of subsidy) received by its
installations.
The looming possibility of carbon leakage and fierce lobbying to prevent loss of competitive-
ness have made it difficult to imagine this energy-intensive industry could be required to buy its
allowances. But free allocation is not convincing either, which is why economists have suggested
replacing it with ‘border adjustment.’ A carbon tax, or charge, could be applied on industrial pro-
ducts entering the European Union. It would allow domestic manufacturers to pass on the cost of
paying for their allowances, without risk of losing market share to foreign competitors whose
prices would also increase. Domestic producers might even be rewarded. If they improved
their environmental performance, they would buy fewer allowances and could market their pro-
ducts slightly below imports. Despite substantial literature on the economic rationale for border
adjustment, the European Commission did not suggest it in its Proposals for the revision of the
EUETS after 2020. The main reason is that it would conflict with the free trade principle of the
World Trade Organisation, especially as more countries implement some form of climate policy.
With the Paris Agreement, a carbon tax on imports is ‘not the message that we want to give,’ sum-
marised a staff member of the Commission (interview, DG CLIMA 2). Border measures clearly
are diplomatically sensitive. Yet, the draft of the ENVI Committee discussed in 2016 introduced
the idea for the cement industry only. Together with the CEO of an eco-cement company, an
environmental organisation (Carbon Market Watch) had lobbied the small group of parliamen-
tarians with some success, before the plenary dropped the idea.17 In a free-market world, trade
barriers ought to be technological. The creation of an Innovation Fund to be operational in
the fourth phase of the EUETS illustrates this logic. Auction revenues would finance demon-
stration projects to foster low-carbon innovations in energy-intensive sectors such as cement.
Meant to ‘boost growth and competitiveness by empowering EU companies with a first-mover
advantage to become global technology leaders,’18 the purpose of the Fund is justified again in
the elusive and authoritative language of competitiveness.
Gaming, exports subsidised through free allowances, and less environmentally efficient products,
have emerged as problematic consequences of trying to prevent carbon leakage in the cement sec-
tor. One might argue that these just confirm that companies are profit-seekers. But in this section,
we also wanted to point out how difficult it may be for energy-intensive industries to adapt to the
new environmental constraint. Cement derives its commercial properties (a cheap, versatile powder
used in the most consumed manmade material in the world) from a manufacturing process that
releases CO2 into the atmosphere and has remained unchanged for decades. Pursuing our explora-
tion of the under-determination of carbon leakage, we saw that the question could draw attention to
specific facets of industrial realities, which do not get discussed if one stops at the anxiety-provoking
concept of loss of competitiveness.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS) and the
ways, in which it regulates energy-intensive industries. The cornerstone of European climate pol-
icy, the EUETS ought to reduce the CO2 emissions of a variety of industrial activities, through the
creation of tradeable environmental intangibles called emissions allowances. We examined the
policy discussions arising around the distribution of the regulatory intangibles, in particular
whether, to whom and under which conditions they should be allocated for free. Central to
these debates was the hypothetical phenomenon of ‘carbon leakage due to loss of competitiveness.’
The idea is that, if a jurisdiction like the European Union unilaterally enforces climate policy,
there is a risk that production in energy-intensive industries linked to global trade (e.g. steel,
cement, aluminium, glass), and associated emissions, relocate to unregulated jurisdictions, via
changes in trade flows (more imports) and investments. The paper explored how the possibility
that the EUETS might cause carbon leakage has been brought about, contested and reframed.
From exposure indicators and trade data to econometrics and benchmarks, we came across
many numerical abstractions that are central to the working of such a market-based climate pol-
icy. We saw that the terms kept fluctuating for establishing whether or not the EUETS could lead
to carbon leakage. Opinion surveys, demonstrations, lobbying and the stubborn endurance of the
idea(l) of a friction-less global economy, constantly reactivated the possibility that environmental
constraint poses a risk to European competitiveness. The possibility of carbon leakage could
neither be established, nor entirely dismissed, and we used the term under-determination to cap-
ture such a state of affairs.
We suggested that what makes carbon leakage endure and have effects (free allocation of surplus
allowances), despite its elusiveness, or because of it, might lie in the potency of any claims about
competitiveness. The fear of industries becoming (even) less competitive than foreign manufac-
turers is so tenacious that it trumps the need to urgently decrease CO2 emissions. As Chiapello
and Engels (2021, this issue) suggest, environmental concerns are a focus for these elaborate inter-
ventions because they are considered important. But these interventions also often fail. Here we
suggest that concerns for competitiveness continually challenge the direction and possibility of
the climate policy in view leading to a form of under-determination that seems characteristic of
the uncertain yet authoritative nature of economic claims. As a source of political anxiety, the com-
petitiveness argument tends to evade the need for evidential clarification. Climate policy appears
condemned to suffer from having the precautionary principle applied for the benefit of the econ-
omy instead of the environment.
One can argue that, when it comes to the accumulation of CO2 into the atmosphere, the only
element that matters in the EUETS is the emissions cap, which, as we pointed out, was too high
for more than a decade. But the paper showed that the ways allowances are distributed can also
be relevant to the environmental consequences of the policy. Companies in the cement sector
were able to game the allocation rules to maximise the amount of allowances they received for
free, thereby turning the climate policy into a production (and emissions) subsidy. Some kind of
reverse carbon leakage might have even occurred. The policy turned out to have the opposite
effect of that intended. It could, therefore, be tempting to talk about failure and blame the industry
for it. What we argue here is slightly different. When a decade ago, the EUETS could be celebrated
for its experimental approach, our account is clearly less optimistic. But it also suggests that the
notion of failure misses the point (Neyland et al. 2019). We showed that in policy making related
to the EUETS, there is not much room for a collective investigation into, and in-depth understand-
ing of industrial realities. The legislative process, which aims to regulate a wide range of sectors at
once, tends to foreclose discussions of the less polemical reasons why some industries emitting large
quantities of CO2 might lobby so hard against the policy (the structure of the sector, the nature of its
products, etc.). In the ongoing carbon leakage debate, the competitiveness argument, too often used
as an appeal to authority, might contribute to this foreclosure.
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Notes
1. The 31 participants are the EU’s 28 member states (before Brexit) plus Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway.
2. For a technical overview of the problems and changes undergone by the policy until the mid-2010s, see Eller-
man, Marcantonini, Zaklan (2014)
3. Although free allocation departed from the ideal market design recommended by the European Commis-
sion, namely the auctioning of allowances, it was argued that it would not undermine the economics of the
EUETS: if an installation could reduce its emissions at a low cost, it would do so to derive revenues by
selling its excess allowances (Ellerman, Convery, de Perthuis, 2010). In the first two phases of the policy,
member states were then in charge of elaborating National Allocation Plans and had to submit it to the
European Commission for evaluation (Mackenzie 2009b). The latter tried to exert some control over
the total quantity of (free) allowances put into circulation, and more than once, downward adjustments
were requested (Kama, 2014)..
4. Traded at around 25 euros in 2008, allowances saw their value decline in 2009 and become particularly low
between 2012 and 2018 (well below 10 euros). See: https://sandbag.org.uk/carbon-price-viewer/.
5. This factor includes the ‘cross-sectoral correction factor’, which had to be introduced to solve the discrepancy
between the calculation of the total amount of allowances handed for free (the so-called industry share) and
the calculation of free allocation based on the carbon leakage list.
6. See, for example, the position of WWF: http://wwf.panda.org/?129881/eu-carbon-market-sets-upanother-
round-of-windfall-profits-for-dirtiest-power-generators.
7. The gross value added is defined as the difference between output – the monetary value of all products dis-
posed on the market – and intermediate consumption – the monetary value of all goods and services con-
sumed by the process of production, except fixed assets.
8. The Commission also commissioned an ‘ex post investigation of cost pass through in the EUETS’, focused on
six sectors, including steel and cement, that suggested that these industries might have actually increased the
prices of their products (de Bruyn et al., 2015).
9. See: https://www.businesseurope.eu/publications/company-survey-reveals-risk-investment-leakage.
10. As Laurens (2018) notes, lobbyists for sectors like steel, cement, ceramic and glass, appear quite united on the
issue of competitiveness in the EUETS.
11. The process is more complicated. Another Committee (Industry, Research and Energy – ITRE) was tasked
with providing an opinion on the draft legislation.
12. In the early 2010s, Germany concentrated a quarter of the European steel production in terms of value and
employment (Bolscher et al 2013).
13. The Parliament’s vote dismissed what environmental organisations considered the most ambitious elements:
the tiered approach and a lower emissions cap (Neyland, Ehrenstein, Milyaeva, 2019).
14. The ownership of cement plants in Europe tends to be concentrated, with a handful of multinationals, such as
LafargeHolcim and HeidelbergCement, dominating the market. These multinationals also often own concrete
plants. In aggregate the European Union ranks as the third producer of cement in the world, after China and
India. See: https://cembureau.eu/cement-101/key-facts-figures/
15. Only a limited number of manufactured products (52) have a benchmark. These were chosen to include a
maximum amount of emissions while keeping it manageable to establish benchmarks for each of them.
For installations that did not manufacture such products, a fall-back approach was developed based on
heat and fuel consumption.
16. Besides the recession, other elements have contributed to increase the surplus of allowances: the implemen-
tation of policy incentives for renewable energies and the import of offsets from project-based market mech-
anisms (MacKenzie, 2009a; Bryant, 2016)
17. For environmentalists, this was not a total failure, as the Directive mentions that border adjustment could be
considered in the future (OJEU, 2018). They were recently proven right. The Green Deal for Europe of the new
President of the European Commission has revived the idea of a border mechanism, which could be tried out
first with simple products like cement and steel (Kahn, 2019). But then, concerns about potential retaliation
have already been voiced by member states.
18. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/innovation-fund_en.
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